Known as a “honey trap,” the tactic has been used for decades to manipulate influential individuals, expose confidential information and create serious security risks for governments and major corporations.
Although the technique is often associated with fictional spy thrillers, its real-world history is far more complicated.
The risks have attracted renewed attention following reports involving Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang, who reportedly resigned on Thursday after a turbulent week surrounding the world’s largest artificial intelligence chipmaker. The controversy initially emerged after reports alleged that he had an extramarital relationship with Alice Huang, a woman unrelated to him whom US officials reportedly believe was passing information to the Chinese government.
Several important details remain unknown, including how Alice Huang may have come to the attention of Chinese intelligence officials, when any potential recruitment took place and whether she obtained confidential information.
Beijing has rejected the accusations, describing claims that she was spying for China as “baseless speculation.”
Isaac Stone Fish, founder of the business intelligence company Strategy Risks, said the reported relationship raised serious concerns regardless of whether sensitive information had actually been shared.
“The lack of judgment of a CEO of one of the most important companies in the world having an affair with someone suspected of being an agent of the Communist Party is very surprising,” Stone Fish said.
“Maybe he never shared any important information with her. But it’s the very existence of (that relationship) that’s a problem in itself.”
Stone Fish described honey trapping as one of the oldest techniques in espionage, emphasizing that it remains “extremely common,” particularly among Chinese and Russian intelligence operations.
How Intelligence Agencies Set Up a Honey Trap
Foreign intelligence services regularly look for individuals who have access to sensitive information, according to John Sipher, a former CIA intelligence officer who served in Asia and Europe and is now a senior fellow at the Michael V. Hayden Center for Intelligence, Policy and International Security.
Authoritarian governments may have additional ways to pressure individuals into cooperating, especially when missions involve romantic relationships or sexual manipulation.
“What the Chinese, the Russians and others can do is they can use a lot more manipulation and pressure (to recruit a spy),” Sipher said.
“They can say, ‘Listen, we’re not going to let you go home, or you’re not going to be able to see your family, unless you work with us.’”
One method is to lure the target into a compromising position, then blackmail or threaten them. For example, if they visit a brothel or sleep with a sex worker, an intelligence agency then “comes in and says, ‘Well, we can arrest you or you can help us,’” said Peter Mattis, president of the Jamestown Foundation, a defense policy think tank based in Washington.
Another approach involves a trained foreign agent deliberately approaching a target with the intention of establishing a romantic connection.
Although this scenario is frequently portrayed in movies and television, Sipher said it is less common in real intelligence operations.
He pointed to the case of Mordechai Vanunu, a former Israeli nuclear technician who revealed details about Israel’s undeclared nuclear program to the British press.
A female Mossad agent posing as an American tourist named Cindy reportedly gained his trust through romantic deception before he was abducted.
However, intelligence operations do not always begin with an agent deliberately pursuing someone.
In many cases, a man or woman develops a relationship naturally with an individual who later attracts the attention of an intelligence service. Once the agency discovers the connection, it may attempt to recruit that person through financial incentives, pressure or threats.
The Cold War’s History of Romantic Espionage
East Germany trained attractive and charismatic men to establish relationships with women working in sensitive government positions. These operatives became known as “Romeo spies.”
Their objective was to develop romantic connections with individuals who could provide access to confidential government information. Sipher recalled that Soviet intelligence services also used similar tactics extensively during the Cold War.
Male and female operatives would approach Western diplomats and journalists, sometimes appearing unexpectedly at their hotel rooms in an effort to establish personal connections.
One of the most extraordinary espionage cases involved French diplomat Bernard Boursicot and Chinese opera singer Shi Pei Pu.
Beginning in the 1960s, Shi convinced Boursicot that he was a woman, and the two maintained a secret romantic relationship for nearly two decades.
The deception went even further when Shi claimed to have given birth to Boursicot’s son.
According to archival reporting by The New York Times, the child was actually a young boy of Uyghur origin who had been sold by his impoverished mother.
At one point, Chinese intelligence officers approached Boursicot and told him that he could continue seeing Shi only if he provided information from the French embassy.
Fearing that his relationship would be ended and concerned about Shi’s safety, Boursicot agreed.
He continued supplying documents for years before eventually arranging to bring Shi and the child to France.
The situation took a dramatic turn when the couple was arrested after arriving in the country. Both were imprisoned and later pardoned.
During the proceedings, the truth about Shi’s biological sex emerged, leaving Boursicot horrified by the deception.
A Chinese Double Agent Who Had Relationships With FBI Officers
Another notable case emerged in the early 2000s and involved Katrina Leung, a Chinese-American woman who had been recruited by the FBI to provide information about China.
Leung was reportedly paid substantial amounts of money for her work, but investigators eventually discovered that she was operating as a double agent.
Rather than simply gathering information for American authorities, she was also providing classified material to Beijing.
Her activities became even more complicated because she was romantically involved with two FBI agents, including the longtime agent who had originally recruited her.
Leung and the agent who had recruited her were arrested in 2003. Under a plea agreement, she spent no more than three months in prison.
Why China Targets More Than American Officials
According to Sipher, Chinese intelligence operations are not restricted to American officials or executives.
“are going after everyone,” he said.
He specifically mentioned Australians, Vietnamese and Singaporeans as potential targets, explaining that Chinese intelligence services pursue information wherever the Communist Party identifies an interest.
Stone Fish agreed that similar tactics could be directed at Japanese, South Korean and European individuals.
He also suggested that Chinese companies could use honey trap techniques against domestic competitors as part of corporate espionage.
Interestingly, China has also publicly warned its own citizens about the dangers of foreign intelligence services using romantic relationships to obtain sensitive information.
In 2024, China’s Ministry of State Security announced that it had uncovered cases of foreign espionage operations using romance and online dating as an entry point.
The ministry warned that foreign agents could hide their identities, arrange seemingly accidental encounters and develop relationships to recruit individuals inside China.
“By carefully disguising their identities, arranging seemingly ‘fatal’ meetings, and weaving seductive traps, they seek to win the convictions and recruit individuals within China, steal state secrets, and endanger China’s national security,” the ministry warned.
Why the Nvidia Case Could Have Wider Consequences
Sipher estimated that these operations succeed approximately 10% of the time. However, he explained that intelligence services do not need to recruit large numbers of people to achieve important results.
“in the espionage business, you only need to have a few key people in key places,” he said.
Artificial intelligence has become one of the most strategically important areas of competition between major powers. Its applications extend across manufacturing, scientific research, social control and military targeting.
“Artificial intelligence has been identified as one of those key technologies that is essential to everything else. It enables manufacturing and it enables scientific discovery, it enables social control, it enables military targeting,” Mattis said.
“You can go across the industry and realize that every member of the leadership of these companies, anyone at the executive level of these companies is likely to be an intelligence target.” The strained U.S.-China relationship adds an additional layer of risk, with the Nvidia fallout threatening to deepen mutual distrust, Stone Fish said. For the U.S., this alleged targeting of Jensen Huang represents a “very clear example of espionage,” while China may fear that Nvidia — a powerful player in the world of artificial intelligence — could act against Beijing’s interests.
Stone Fish and Mattis both emphasized that personal connections can create vulnerabilities for almost anyone, regardless of their professional position. Romantic relationships are only one possibility, as friendships, professional partnerships and other personal connections can also be exploited.
Instead, companies and their employees need to remain aware that access to sensitive information can make them attractive targets.
Mattis summed up the warning with a straightforward message: “You’re a target. Don’t be a fool. And make sure you ask questions.”
